“Time is the medium of life" (1 p. 541).
It is almost meaningless to attempt to define the self without the sense of time since the two are intimately linked. According to Kant, the sense of time enables one to distinguish oneself from the environment. Zakay (2) emphasizes that the sense of time is not one of the five senses, even though it may feel like it is: "although we doubtless have a time sense, our bodies are not equipped with a sensory organ for the passage of time in the same way that we have eyes and ears—and the respective sensory cortices—for detecting light and sound" (3 p. 1955). At the same time, it should be noted that time in itself is not something we perceive but rather something that is being sensed, and created, in the act of perceiving: "we notice time through perception" (4 p. 1). Crucially, time can be sensed during altered states of consciousness (ASC)(5; 6), the classic example of which is torture (7 pp. 41-5).
Pöppel (8) defines the fundamental aspects of the experience of time as: (1) duration; (2) non-simultaneity; (3) order; (4) past and present; and (5) change (including the passage of time). Notice however that there exists inherent tension between these elements, for instance order and tenses contradict one another (on this issue see McTaggart's (9) serious A versus serious B). These problems lead us to St Augustine (10), who defined the sense of duration — the experience of time or the sense of time — as purely subjective. It seems that advanced empirical evidence cannot solve the problem of time, since "time itself is not a property in the empirical world" (3 p. 1959). Rather, this has led some scholars to argue that (sense of) time (duration) is merely "an aspect of subjectivity" (7 p. 2).
Note, however, that to argue that time is subjective is to claim that time is "a function of consciousness" (11 p. 5). Indeed, in many ways, the problem of time goes hand in hand with understanding consciousness. Thus, the claim that sense of time is constructed by one’s consciousness in fact maintains the concept that sense of time is an internal psychological process — in Muldoon’s words, "Duration as a specifically human time is therefore the very 'stuff' which characterizes our inner life"(12 p. 256).
James
(13) was aware of this essential problem, and for this reason he embraced Clay's terminology,
presenting the
specious present: "we are constantly aware of a certain duration—the specious present—varying from a few seconds to probably not more than a minute, and this duration (with its content perceived as having one part earlier and another part later) is the original intuition of time"
(13 p. 642). The sense of
nownessis a subjective moment
(14; 15), since, a priori, the experience of time demands perception of motion
(7). However, motion demands duration, and duration is the result of a subjective process and not objective features of reality: "Awareness of change is thus the condition on which our perception of time's flow depends"
(13 p. 620).
Although psychological time, biological time (2) and, obviously, physical time (16) exist, there is no internal clock in one's body (2), hence the question of how one has a sense of time remains unanswered (3 p. 1961). It appears that one can (and practically does) estimate time by relying on cognitive and emotional processes (2; 3; 13), and hence it is obvious that "the subjective passage of time and estimates of duration vary considerably" (3 p. 1960). According to Wittmann (3) and Craig (17) timekeeping is rooted in one's sensations, and consequently — adopting Damásio's (18) concept — embedded in feelings, emotions, and emotional moments (19; 17). Negative emotional arousals are experienced as longer than positive arousals (20). As a general statement it can be simply said that increased attention to one's experience (for example in situations of stress, while waiting, and so on) results in a longer estimation of time's duration and, more interestingly, it turns out that when relying solely upon one’s inner sense of time, time appears to pass intolerably slowly.
For Husserl, the question of "time-consciousness" is the most “important and difficult of all phenomenological problems” (PCIT, No. 50, No. 39). To be precise, the "experience of time" (21 p. 10), is themost fundamental obstacle in understanding the structure of consciousness.
In order to understand Husserl’s definition of time, it is useful to compare it with the Newtonian concept of time. Essentially, according to the Newtonian approach each moment is isolated and separate, and therefore lacks a sense of nowness. The phenomenological investigation (epoché), attempts to define different kinds of terms such as duration, succession, continuity, and temporality(22), and to this end, Husserl developed a whole new time structure, rooted within the lived moment. According to Husserl, "one cannot discover the least thing about objective time through phenomenological analysis" (21 p. 6). Indeed, Husserl endeavored to define the structure of consciousness as something that enables and constitutes the sense of now — but once again, this structure does not mold an anchor for objective time, "the experienced now is not a point of objective time" (21 p. 6). Thus, Husserl defines three levels of time: (a) objective time, (b) subjective time, and (c) consciousness of internal time.
The living-present is, according to Husserl, not a knife-edged moment but rather an extended moment. In fact, if consciousness were knife-edged, perception, extension, and succession would not be possible. Therefore, the structure of consciousness must have some degree of width and depth, present, past, and future. In view of this, the structure of consciousness must be able to produce the extended moment which contains the past (retention) and the future (protention) as an integral part of a double intentional structure. To be precise, retention as well as protention are intentional, defined as "double intentionality" or "horizontal intentionality". These horizons (double intentionality) constitute the living-moment. Blending retention (just past) and protention (one's anticipation) with the primal impression generates (at least in Husserl's opinion) a thicker sense of the now: the implicit (retention and protention), turn into explicit, primal impression. This thicker sense of the now includes past, present, and future: "Each new now is the content of a new primal impression"(21 p. 70).
In the moment of perceiving (X) the thing that is being perceived (X) sinks into the just-past (X’), and is embedded in one's temporal horizon (retention), this just-past-moment is not given to us as "a memory" but as an intuition, something that is given (created) for the first time. This intentional intuition, or horizontal gestalt field, includes "now, not-now and not-yet-now" (23 p. 78). Husserl provides the following example: "the flight of the birds appears as primally given in the now-point but as fully given in a continuum of the past that terminates in the now and continually in an ever new now, while what has continuum preceded recedes ever further into the continuum of the past" (21 p. 71). Is short, Husserl locates the primal impression within a temporal horizon that includes retention and protention (retention being the just-past primal impression and protention the anticipatory moment of the living-present, horizons of anticipation).
1.2.1.3. Husserl's Time-Consciousness Structure
The temporal structure of consciousness must be wider than the knife-edged/primal impression moment. Zahavi's (22) analysis reveals that Husserl's structure of consciousness is a unification of the just-past with the just-about-to-occur, making Husserl's Time-Consciousness structure a precondition for any kind of perception: "We can perceive temporal objects because consciousness is not caught in the now. We do not merely perceive the now-phase of the triad, but also its past and future phases" (22 p. 82). It is important to note that Husserl’s phenomenology does not call for any kind of a-temporal, Kantian subject that constitutes consciousness. The subjective time is not prior to one's consciousness. To use Zahavi’s (22; 24) terminology, Husserl's theory requires an "implicit…primitive type of self awareness…a minimal form of self awareness" (22 p. 88). Furthermore, Zahavi argues that Husserl's "Inner time-consciousness is simply another name for the pre-reflective self-awareness of our experiences" (22 p. 91).
1.2.2.1. Heideggerand Husserl
Heideggerdeveloped his phenomenology in light of Husserl’s internal time-consciousness theory. As for Husserl, the concept of time is central to Heidegger's philosophy: "Time is clearly the keystone to Heidegger’s phenomenological project" (25 p. 98). However, while Husserl underlined mainly the retentional component in one's life and neglected the protentional vector, Heideggerdedicated himself to analyzing the protentional aspect of one's life (25). According to Heidegger the futural dimension determines one's life: "with regard to time, this means that the fundamental phenomenon of time is the future" (26 p. 14). In fact, it is only through the future that the past and the present open up. Noticeably, Dasein (there-being) is the most important idea in Heidegger's philosophy; "Dasein is that entity which is characterized as being-in-the-world" (26 p. 7).
As humans, we are finite creatures and death plays a fundamental role in our existence. This finitude controls our existence "but as far as Da-sein goes, death is only in an existentiell being toward death. [Sein zum Tode]" (27 p. 216). In other words, humans exist within a limited time framework that defines us as humans. This limitation gives meaning to one's life and, as a matter of fact, death is the meaning of life: "time does not find its meaning in eternity, time finds its meaning in death" (28 p. 117). We exist, then, in between birth and death, and these are both part of the present moment. In addition, these both serve to define one's phenomenal field: "death is, after all, only the 'end' of Dasein, and formally speaking, it is just one of the ends that embraces the totality of Dasein. But the other 'end' is the 'beginning', 'birth'. Only the being 'between' birth and death presents the whole we are looking for" (27 p. 342). According to Heidegger, this phenomenal field (between birth and death) is a field of possibilities: "Dasein means to exist is possibility" (29 p. 40). Yet critically, Heidegger maintains that this field of possibilities is loaded with anxiety, "a basic state-of-mind" (27 p. 179), resulting from the fact that as humans we are thrown face to face with the world.
To be anxious is not to fear “something" (X) but quite the opposite: "anxiety is anxious in the face of the "nothing" of the world" (27 p. 393). This nothingness is equivalent to one's sense of death: "anxiety arises out of Being-in-the-worldas thrown Being-towards-death" (27 p. 395). Anxiety is a fundamental feature of our existence, arising when the world's true face is revealed as meaningless (30). However, this meaningless world is what gives us, humans, the possibility to choose, to be active in the world, to control our fate. Yet this kind of freedom (to choose) is not part of the structure of humans, but part of the structure of existence. That is to say that I give/enforce meaning to/on this world not because I choose to do so but simply because it is a fundamental component of my own existence (31).
Temporality is "prior to the distinction between subject and object, in which things come into being" (25 p. 99). It grasps the essence of time: "temporal does not mean I 'in time' but time itself" (29 p. 49). Moreover, temporalityand concern go hand in hand — “temporality is the meaning of care" (32 p. 145). Since the structure of temporality opens Dasein to the world — "Time is the temporalization that discloses and encloses Dasein’s world" (25 p. 98) — it is clear why (a) temporality, (b) Dasein, and (c) concern are connected. However, temporality is neither something that comes alongside Dasein, nor the quality of Dasein, but rather, as Heidegger puts it, "Dasein always is in a manner of its possible temporal being" (26 pp. 20-21). Namely, we exist as temporal beings and, therefore, the ontological structure of Dasein and the original time are indistinguishable; they are one and the same. To exist in the world as being-in-the-world is to be concerned with the world, and to be concerned with the world is to be temporality in the world. Indeed, in order to understand the characteristic of Dasein, it is necessary to understand the structure of temporality since temporality is the essence of time and "being is to be interpreted as time" (25 p. 98).
The structure of temporality is built upon three transcendence vectors (Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in (einer Welt) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnenden Seienden)) which are revealed by the fact that our existing in the world is charged by being concerned with the world. While embedded in being concerned, the structure of temporality opens in three directions, three ecstases (temporalization time always stands outside of itself) of temporality: (a) future: "Being-ahead-of-itself", (b) past: "Being-already-in" the world, and (c) present: "Being alongside" the world. Each dimension of these three ecstases stands outside of itself (ecstatic) in the midst of the other; there it encounters itself and becomes unified.
Thus, Dasein is, similarly to time, outside of itself in the world. A fundamental and immediate implication of this ecstaticstructure of temporality is that time is neither completely subjective nor totally objective, but rather that time manifests itself through the three dimensions (ecstases) of temporality that turn this world into a world full of meaning, a world being cared for by the subject.
Essentially, between these three dimensions of being, the "Being-ahead-of-itself" is the most significant: "the basic character of this temporalness of being-in is futuralness" (29 p. 54). The future is preliminary both to the past and present; "Being-ahead-of-itself" enables the subject to act in the world since the futural dimension is inherently in one's being (33): "Dasein, conceived in its most extreme possibility of Being, is time itself, not in time" (26 pp. 13-14). The three dimensional ontological structure of temporality generates a situation in which one always goes ahead of oneself (25). To exist as a temporal being is to be outside oneself: “Temporality is the primordial 'outside of itself' in and for itself” (27 p. 302). This openness to the world is part of the natural structure of the original time (temporality) and, as was noted above, this openness goes in three directions: future-present-past or ahead-of-itself-already-Being-in(a world)-as-Being-alongside. By being ahead of itself (one is at all times in a state of anticipation) temporality enables the world as we know it; it allows to Dasein to exist in the world as being-in-the-world.
Thus Dasein opens time: by being Ahead-of-itself, it opens itself to the future, by already-Being-in, it opens itself to past; and, by Being-alongside, it is always projecting itself into the present. Crucially, projecting is not something we do but a mode of Dasein that reflects its openness to the future.
In light of the above, Dasein can be described as a horizon of existence: “Dasein is primarily determined by the most extreme possibility[ies] (26 p. 10)… Dasein as human life is primarily being possible, the Being of the possibility of its certain yet indeterminate past" (26 p. 12).One exists within the horizonal field, and it should be noted that "being is to be interpreted as time" (25 p. 98), in fact, according to Heidegger, the very essence of this world is such that allows its temporality structure.
According to Merleau-Ponty, one's past and future, although both exist equally and mutually in the present as finite and subjective dimensions, simultaneously constitute an integral part of the present moment: "what is past or future for me is present in the world" (34 p. 478). Indeed, while for Husserl the past (retention) is significant, and for Heidegger the future, Merleau-Ponty defines these as ontological equals: "the relation of future to present would be by putting it on the same footing as that between present and past" (34 p. 480).
Merleau-Ponty begins by saying that "we have already discovered, between time and subjectivity, a much more intimate relationship" (34 p. 476). Indeed, time, similarly to the subject, cannot be reduced to simple physical laws (35). Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty rejects James' (1890) metaphor and argues that time is not a river or waterfall. In fact, according to Merleau-Ponty, this kind of "metaphor is in reality extremely confused" (34 p. 477). One cannot see the world from outside or from the bank of the river, but rather only by being-in-the-world: "there are no events without someone to whom they happen" (34 p. 477).
As Husserl, Merleau-Ponty determines that the structure of consciousnees is extremely important to our understanding of the structure of time: "consciousness deploys or constitutes time" (34 p. 481). Just as the subject is inseparable from the world (34 p. 500), so too consciousness should be defined as being-in-the-world: "the activity of consciousness is essentialy interaction with the world" (36 p. 250). Yet, in order to fully comprehend the meaning of this being-in-the-world, it is necessary to examine how Merleau-Ponty bonds the subject with the world. Merleau-Ponty maintains that "at the heart of the subject himself we discovered, then, the presence of the world" (34 p. 498). It may seem that Merleau-Ponty is, in fact, an idealist, especially in light of his statement that "The subject is a being-in-the-world and the world remains ‘subjective’" (34 p. 500). Indeed, Merleau-Ponty's declaration that the "subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects" (34 p. 500) echoes George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) terminology. Nevertheless this is not the case, and since Merleau-Ponty is not an idealist, he does not fail in the same place as Husserl. In no way does Merleau-Ponty argue that the world depends on one's consciousness: "What, in fact, do we mean when we say that there is no world without a being in the world? Not indeed that the world is constituted by consciousness, but on the contrary that consciousness always finds itself already at work in the world" (34 p. 502). Indeed, Merleau-Ponty establishes a unique releationship between the subject and the world and between the structure of consciousness as being-in-the-world and the structure of time; using Romdenh-Romluc's words, the structure of time arises "from the interaction between the subject and the world" (36 p. 218). In the most radical manner, Merleau-Ponty believes that the only way "to imprisoned time from present" (34 p. 481), is by constituting time on the structure of consciousness. Simply by anchoring the structure of time within the structure of consciousness we are capabale of unfolding past and the future within the present.
The absent dimension is critical for Merleau-Ponty. We exist (and create) within the present moment and, as a result, past and future are experienced as absent. However, in order for one to experience these absent elements, one must, according to Merleau-Ponty, already be familiar with them (past and future). Romdenh-Romluc (36) suggests that this sense of familiarity is equivalent to the experience of time: "there is one single time which is self-confirmatory, which can bring nothing into existence unless it has already laid that thing’s foundations as present and eventual past, and which establishes itself at a stroke" (34 p. 489).
The following example serves to illustrate this concept: While looking at a pile of books standing to the right of my computer screen, I see only one side of any book but, nevertheless, I implicitily perceive the whole book, simply because I am already, pre-reflectively, familiar with the shape and texture of these books; they are part of my phenomenal\percptual field. This same analogy is applicable also to one’s sense of past\future, which are both part of one’s phenomenal field: "I have the impression that the world itself lives outside me, just as absent landscapes live on beyond my visual field, and as my past was formerly lived on the earlier side of my present" (34 p. 389). One projects one's anticipations onto the future, hence the future is not empty but rather the opposite is true: the future finds meaning in the present. Thus we are aware of both the absence of the past and the absence of the future, a kind of awareness that reveals them both to be part of one's perceptual horizon.
Likewise, on the background of the explicit (glass), we constantly find the implicit (the surface): "the present, for Merleau-Ponty, is what is perceived explicity, together with its horizons that implicitly refer to what is hidden but co-present" (36 p. 246). The future is part of one's present in the same way that the wall hidden behind the picture exists as part of my perceptual phenomenal field: hidden but existent. Thus, it may be said that Merleau-Ponty's horizons are implict and unfold past and future, in addition to all that is currently hidden from one's gaze. Merleau-Ponty embraces Husserl's retention and protention as implicit dimensions in one's experience. Going one step further, it can be suggested that the experience of time, temporality, is not an artificial bond between two diverse experiences, but rather a single dynamic experience of a constantly changing present (15): the implicit in the present (protention) becomes explicit (primal moment) and, simultaniously, this explicit present becomes implicit (retention) in turn. This description, according to Merleau-Ponty, is "the living present" (34 p. 503).
Yet, Merleau-Ponty declares that "Time as the immanent object of a consciousness is time brought down to one uniform level, in other words it is no longer time at all" (34 pp. 481-2). Since past, present, and future cannot all exist simultaneously, in order to possess a sense of time we must separate between them. According to Merleau-Ponty, on this point Husserl was mistaken. Merleau-Ponty's solution is to define time "not as an object of our knowledge, but as a dimension of our being" (34 p. 483). To be a subject is to exist within time: time is the fourth dimension of the phenomenal field.
Merleau-Ponty defines Husserl's passive synthesis not a solution to the problem of the structure of time but quite the opposite, "a pointer to the problem" (34 p. 486). In addition, he embraces a number of Heideggerian concepts, such as temporality and time. Merleau-Ponty defines temporality as "future-which-lapses-into-the-past-by-coming-into-the-present" (34 p. 488), and time as oneself, "I am myself time" (34 p. 489). In fact, by definition, time is not something that can be observed by the subject, exactly for the same reason that one’s face cannot be observed from within – thus "the subject is identified with temporality" (34 p. 494) in the same way that one’s face is identified with oneself.
Merleau-Ponty does not stop here but takes this subjective concept a step further, maintaining that "we must understand time as the subject and the subject as time" (34 p. 490). Essentially, Merleau-Ponty does not claim that time is created by the subject: "I am not the creator of time any more than of my heart-beats… time flows through me, whatever I do" (34 p. 490).
Merleau-Ponty draws a link between the self and time: "It is of the essence of time to be not only actual time, or time which flows, but also time which is aware of itself, for the explosion or dehiscence of the present towards a future is the archetype of the relationship of self to self" (34 p. 495). That is to say that "the revelation of self to self, is merely the hollow in which time is formed" (34 p. 501). To describe the subject as being-in-the-worldis to maintain that the subject is rooted in the world. As was demonstrated above, this kind of description enables Heidegger to argue that one becomes familiar with oneself through the way that one acts within the world. Therefore, to understand time is to examine it from the point of view of the subject as being-in-the-world. The subject is identical to time and hence, similarly to the subject, time is rooted within the world: "It is by communicating with the world that we communicate beyond all doubt with ourselves. We hold time in its entirety, and we are present to ourselves because we are present to the world" (34 p. 493).
According to Merleau-Ponty, one cannot see the world with his body: "it is essential to me not only to have a body, but to have this body" (34 p. 501). We cannot analyze our body merely by utilizing mechanistic laws (12; 37), that is to say, we cannot reduce the lived body into pure physical laws. The lived body can be defined as the phenomenal body: "the objective body is not the true version of the phenomenal body" and this phenomenal body combines past and future within the present moment.
References
1. Mann, Thomas. The magic mountain. New York : Knopf, 1924.
2. Zakay, Dan. Psychological time. s.l. : Ministry of Defence, 1998.
3. The inner experience of time. Wittmann, Marc. 2009, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Vol. 364, pp. 1955-1967.
4. Le Poidevin, Robin. The Experience and Perception of Time. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Online] 2011. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-experience/#5.
5. Altered Temporality. Shanon, Benny. 1, 2001b, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 8, pp. 35-58.
6. Psychobiology of Altered States of Consciousness. Vaitl, Dieter, et al. 2005, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 131, pp. 98–127.
7. Flaherty, Michael. A watched pot: How we experience time. New York : New York University Press, 1999.
8. Pöppel, Ernst. Time Perception. [ed.] Richard Held. Handbook of Sensory Physiology. Berlin : Springer-Verlag, 1978, Vol. VIII: Perception.
9. The Unreality of Time. McTaggart, John. 1908, Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, pp. 456-473.
10. Augustine, St. Confessions. [ed.] R Pinecoffin. [trans.] ______. Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1961.
11. Hartocollis, Peter. Time and timelessness, or, The varieties of temporal experience. New York : International Universities Press, 1983.
12. Time, Self, and Meaning in the Works of Henri Bergson, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Paul Ricoeur. Muldoon, Mark. 3, 1991, Philosophy Today, Vol. 35.
13. James, William. The Principles of Psychology. London : Macmillan, 1890. Vol. 1.
14. The Brain's Way to Create "Nowness". Poeppel, Ernst. [ed.] Harald Atmanspacher and Eva Ruhnau. Berlin, Heidelberg and New York : Springer-Verlag, 1997, Time, Temporality, Now, pp. 107-120.
15. Varela, Francisco. The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time consciousness. [ed.] Jean Petitot, et al. Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1999, pp. 266-329.
16. Greene, Brian. The Fabric of the Cosmos. New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.
17. Emotional moments across time: a possible neural basis for time perception in the anterior insula. Craig, A. 2009, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, Vol. 364, pp. 1933–1942.
18. Damásio, António. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York : Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999.
19. Craig, A. Interoception and emotion: a neuroanatomical. [ed.] Lewis Haviland-Jones and Barrett Lisa. Handbook of Emotion. 3rd edn. New York : Guilford, 2008, pp. 272–288.
20. The influence of affective factors on time perception. Angrilli, Alessandro, et al. 6, 1997, Perception & Psychophysics, Vol. 59, pp. 972-982.
21. Husserl, Edmund. The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness. [ed.] Martin Heidegger. The Hague : M. Nijhoff, 1964.
22. Zahavi, Dan. Husserl's Phenomenology. Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2003.
23. Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. The phenomenological mind : an introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive science. London : Routledge, 2008.
24. Zahavi, Dan. Subjectivity and Selfhood. Cambridge : The MIT Press, 2006.
25. Greaves, Tom. Starting with Heidegger. London : Continuum, 2010.
26. Heidegger, Martin. The concept of time. [trans.] William McNeill. Oxford : Blackwell, 2002.
27. —. Being and time. [trans.] Joan Stambaugh. Albany : New York Press, 1996.
28. Heidegger and `the concept of time'. Alweiss, Lilian. 3, 2002, History of the Human Sciences, Vol. 15, pp. 117-132.
29. Heidegger, Martin. The concept of time. [trans.] Ingo Farin. London : Continuum, 2011.
30. Bergman, Samuel Hugo. Contemporary Thinkers. Jerusalem : Magness Press, 1970.
31. Mansbach, Abraham. Beyond subjectivism: Heidegger on language and the human being. Westport, Connecticut : Greenwood Press, 2002.
32. Mulhall, Stephen. Routledge philosophy guidebook to Heidegger and Being and time. London : Routledge, 1996.
33. Pearl, Joel. A question of time. Ramat Gan : Bar-Ilan University Press, 2011.
34. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of perception. [trans.] Colin Smith. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2002.
35. Varela, Francisco, Thompson, Evan and Rosch, Eleanor. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge : MIT Press, 1991.
36. Romdenh-Romluc, Komarine. Routledge philosophy guidebook to Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of perception. New York : Routledge, 2011.
37. Muldoon, Mark. Tricks of Time : Bergson, Merleau-Ponty & Ricoeur in Search of Time, Self & Meaning. Pittsburgh : Duquesne University Press, 2006. Vol. 35.
